


## The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951: A Nonconformist History of Our Times

*I. F. Stone*

*DOC | \*audiobook | ebooks | Download PDF | ePub*



[Download](#)

[Read Online](#)

#1165388 in Books 1988-10Ingredients: Example IngredientsOriginal language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.20 x 6.20 x 1.20l, #File Name: 0316817708368 pages | File size: 20.Mb

**I. F. Stone : The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951: A Nonconformist History of Our Times** before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951: A Nonconformist History of Our Times:

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Korea again? Not if we know the lies and learn from the last time...By George N. SchmidtAs Donald Trump proves both his ignorance and the fact that he is probably a "doter" (an

old many into dotage) by his ignorance of the First Korea War (I use this in reference to the First and "Second Indochina War", despite Ken Burns' latest revisionism), every American patriot needs to know the facts of how we (and the "United Nations") were tricked into the bloody war in Korea from 1950 to 1953. Although I.F. Stone's study ends long before that war did, it's important to know how much lying was being done by our leaders (both military and civilian, and not simply Douglas MacArthur) to keep Americans committed to that so-called "police action." Other works, like the Cummins studies, give more detail, but Stone's was the foremost and most courageous of those which told the truth about "The Forgotten War" because he wrote and published it at the heart of the "McCarthy Era." And it's worth noting that Donald Trump was schooled in the darker arts of bombast and bombastic mendacity by Roy Cohn, McCarthy's right hand (in all senses) man. As those who know Korea know, long before Curtis LeMay became infamous by proposing that the United States bomb Vietnam "back into the stone age," the U.S. military (mostly, the Air Force) had done just that to Korea. So the lessons learned by millions of "North Koreans" and their leadership include the fact that they had to have a more credible counter to the United States (in 2017, nuclear weapons) while they continues to expand the underground civilization they had been forced to invent when the American airmen flattened everything and killed everyone north of the 38th parallel. This book needs to become a new best seller today.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. How to read the daily papersBy Marc LichtmanIf nothing else, this book will show you how to read newspapers, understanding that much isn't true, that that even what is true usually lacks sufficient context to be able to show the larger truth.The best books to read on the Korean War, are those by Bruce Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Studies of the East Asian Institute), *Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*, and *The Korean War: A History* (Modern Library Chronicles). But Cumings, who wrote an introduction to another edition of this book, first developed an interest in Korea by reading Stone.To understand why the Soviet Union allowed the division of Korea and Vietnam, and kept Stalinized Communist Parties from coming to power in countries like Greece, it is necessary to understand the counterrevolutionary nature of Stalinism. While there is a huge amount of material, starting with Trotsky, especially *The Revolution Betrayed* and *The Third International after Lenin*. To see how revolutionaries in the US fought against the Korean War and the witch hunt, I recommend *Notebook of an Agitator: From the Wobblies to the Fight against the Korean War and McCarthyism* (paperback).Stone's book *The Trial of Socrates* is another classic, and there is a good biography of I.F. Stone, *Izzy: A Biog Of I.f. Stone*.8 of 9 people found the following review helpful. Courageous JournalismBy jrjrhjrjrhThis controversial book, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* by I. F. Stone was originally published in 1952 during the Korean War (1950-1953) and republished in 1970 during the Vietnam War (1960-1975). It raises questions about the origin of the Korean War, makes a case that the United States government manipulated the United Nations, and gives evidence that the U.S. military and South Korean oligarchy dragged out the war by sabotaging the peace talks.Publishing such a book in the U.S. during the time of McCarthyism, while the war was still continuing was an act of journalistic courage. In the 1990s, forty years later, declassified U.S., Soviet and People's Republic of China documents both confirmed some and corrected some of Stone's story.Until his death in 1989, Stone was an experienced and respected, independent, left-wing journalist and iconoclast. This book-length feat of journalism, with over 600 citations for his quotes and materials, is a testament to Stone's search for a way to strengthen his readers to think for themselves, rather than be overwhelmed by official stories and war propaganda.The standard telling was that the Korean War was an unprovoked aggression by the North Koreans beginning on June 25, 1950, undertaken at the behest of the Soviet Union to extend the Soviet sphere of influence to the whole of Korea, completely surprising the South Koreans, the U.S., and the U.N.But was it a surprise? Could an attack by 70,000 men using at least 70 tanks launched simultaneously at four different points have been a surprise?Stone gathers contemporary reports from South Korean, U.S. and U.N. sources documenting what was known before June 25. The head of the U.S. CIA, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, is reported to have said on the record, "that American intelligence was aware that 'conditions existed in Korea that could have meant an invasion this week or next.'" (p. 2) Stone writes that "America's leading military commentator, Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times, a trusted confidant of the Pentagon, reported that they [U.S. military documents] showed 'a marked buildup by the North Korean People's Army along the 38th Parallel beginning in the early days of June.'" (p. 4)How and why did U.S. President Truman so quickly decide by June 27 to commit the U.S. military to battle in South Korea? Stone makes a strong case that there were those in the U.S. government and military who saw a war in Korea and the resulting instability in East Asia as in the U.S. national interest. Stone presents the ideas and actions of them, including John Foster Dulles, General Douglas MacArthur, President Syngman Rhee and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, which appear to amount to a willingness to see the June 25 military action by North Korea as another Pearl Harbor in order to "commit the United States more strongly against Communism in the Far East." (p. 21). Their reasoning may have been, Stone thought, the sooner a war with China and/or Russia the better before both become stronger. President Truman removed Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, according to Stone's account, because Johnson had been selling this doctrine of preventive war. (p. 93)Stone shows that Truman committed the U. S. military to the war in Korea, then went to the U.N. for sanctions against North Korea. "It was neither honorable nor wise," Stone argues, "for the U.N. under pressure from an interested great power to condemn a country

for aggression without investigation and without hearings its side of the case." (p. 50) But that is what the U. S. insisted should happen using, Stone argues, distorted reports to rush its case. Then when the war came to a stalemate at the 38th Parallel, Stone makes a strong case that U.S. Army headquarters provoked or created incidents to derail the ceasefire negotiations. When the North Koreans and Chinese had ceded on Nov. 4, 1952 to the three demands of the U.N. side, the U. S. military spread a story that "The Communists had brutally murdered 5,500 American prisoners." The talks were being dragged out, the U.S. military argued, because "The communists don't want to have to answer questions about what happened to their prisoners" and they are lower than "barbarians." (pp. 324-25) At no time after these reports were these "atrocities" reported again or documented. But hope of a ceasefire subsided. Stone takes the story in time only a little beyond the dismissal of MacArthur on April 11, 1951. He quotes press reports as late as January 1952 that "there still could be American bombing and naval blockade of Red China if Korean talks fail." (1) The evidence which Stone presents is solid but circumstantial. What else could it be, with the official documents still unavailable? In the 1960s, the Rand Corporation, a major think tank originally funded by the U.S. Air Force, conducted studies with additional information and according to one reviewer came to "almost identical conclusions" as Stone. (2) Stone's telling of the history of the Korean War, emphasizing the opportunistic response by the forces in the U.S. advocating rollback and also downplaying the role of the Soviet Union challenged the dominant assumption that this was Stalin's war. "Until the release of Western documents in the 1970s, prompted a new wave of literature on the war, his remained a minority view." (3) Then in the 1990s, documents from the former Soviet archives became available, as did telegrams and other sources from the PRC archives. Scholars examining these documents and fitting the pieces together were able to make the case that Kim Il-sung had sought and eventually received Soviet support for a military effort to unify Korea. Stone had been wrong to suspect that General MacArthur and John Foster Dulles somehow colluded in the start of the Korean War. But Stone did a service by documenting the role of sectors of U.S. policymakers looking for an opportunity to push the USSR and the PRC back from Northeast Asia. Bruce Cumings studied the detailed policy debate in the U.S. which led to the policy of active containment. Cumings' book, "The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II" gives substance to the internal fight between supporters of rollback and those who supported containment, which for Stone was journalistic speculation. In 1952 when it was published, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* met with almost a complete press blackout and boycott. But that included no rebuttals or answers from official U.S. sources. There was a republication in 1970 and the book has been translated at least into Spanish, Italian, and Japanese. Some chapters also appeared in French. I. F. Stone's case is thought provoking and helpful, especially when tensions seem always being stirred up again on the Korean Peninsula, and manipulated wars are still in style. Perhaps however journalism like that of Stone's and lessons from the first Korean War are making a second Korean War less likely. I think that would please I.F. Stone. 1. *Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 17, 1952. 2. Stephen E. Ambrose, Professor of Maritime History at the Naval College in the Baltimore Sun. 3. Kathryn Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Korean War: The State of Historical Knowledge," in *The Korean War in World History*, edited by William Stueck, University Press of Kentucky, 2004, page 63. 4. Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1990

I believe this book serves a threefold purpose. It is a case-study in the cold war. It is also a study in war propaganda, in how to read newspapers and official documents in wartime. Emphasis, omission, and distortion rather than outright lying are the tools of the war propagandists, and this book may help the reader to learn how to examine their output - and sift out the facts - for himself. Finally this book is what it purports to be, not "inside stuff" or keyhole revelations but the hidden history of the Korean War, the facts to be found in the official accounts themselves if texts are carefully examined and reports collated. -- excerpt from author's preface