# The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931

*Adam Tooze*
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




#363407 in Books Tooze Adam 2014-11-13 2014-11-13Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.26 x 2.04 x 6.30l, 1.00 #File Name: 0670024929672 pagesThe Deluge The Great War America and the Remaking of the Global Order 1916 1931 | File size: 35.Mb

**Adam Tooze : The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931** before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931:

97 of 98 people found the following review helpful. A brilliant reframing of the early 20th centuryBy greg taylorFirst, a comment or two on the negative reviews. The negative comments have two point- first, that the book is poorly written and edited and 2. that it is unoriginal in content.As to the first, I can only disagree. I read nothing but scholarly nonfiction and, while Tooze is not a great writer, he is a fine writer of history.I did not find that it could have been a much shorter book either. He is covering a lot of territory and he tries to do it justice. The only real problem I had with the editing occurs with Figure 3 on page 357. I have no idea what the Y axis represents. If anyone knows, please leave an explanation in the comments.As for the content, while I am no expert in this period of history, I found the content to be original and fascinating. Americans of a certain age were told that Wilson tried to change what wars were fought for and how the international community would handle conflict in the aftermath of WW1. Tooze's story is more complicated, nuanced and believable.Tooze's basic theme is the recasting of American power in the aftermath of WW1. America through its military, economic and cultural strength(by which I mean the appeal of Wilsonianism) was able to provincialize (Tooze's ugly word) Europe. America was economically able to veto or render impotent many of the governmental policies of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, China and Russia. The fact that there was real differences of opinion between the Congress and the Presidents (Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, Hoover) which made it difficult for the other powers to know what to expect from the U.S. in terms of consistent policy made it that much harder for any of them to know what to do.I feel that Tooze tells his story with great understanding of the individual politics of each of the above countries. We read how the Irish conflict and the struggle of Indian independence limited Britain's options, of the different parties contending for power in Japan and of the struggles for control by different factions of Chinese warlords and parties. We also get a good sense on how the business and political communities in each country clashed over policy.As stated above, I am no expert. If there is a book that tells this story better and more comprehensively, I wish the critics would name it so I can read it. What I can tell you is that this book has driven me to read some of his sources. Tooze has awakened my interest in this period of history by exposing my ignorance. For that, I bow in his direction.20 of 21 people found the following review helpful. An important bookBy John KIt seems the central themes are 1) economic power and public policy shaped the course of The Great War far more than is the conventional wisdom and 2) far from being an isolationist Wilson and successors aggressively sought to achieve hegemony, particularly at the expense of Britain, by ending Imperialism and employing early twentieth century American capitalism to create the great American empire. Much of the book I found compelling, however I felt at times the author made important assertions supporting his themes that did not necessarily follow from the facts as presented. My reading of this period suggests the incredibly complex dynamics preclude attribution to the flow of this history to just these factors. Still, for me a terrific read.12 of 13 people found the following review helpful. Good yet not exceptionalBy R. L. HuffCambridge-Yale historian Adam Tooze has long been a master at his craft - one can't call it a mere profession. This work supplements his earlier "Wages of Destruction" in defining the post-1918 Versailles world, by taking us back to its origins in WW I and forward to its collapse fifteen years later. Yet for all his elegance in form and exquisite detail of research - making it worthy of four stars - I have to withhold the fifth because his perspective is not an "original revision" at all. It boils down to a fairly conventional tour over well-trod paths. Three main points leaped at me as proof.First, in Wilson's about-face regarding European war, Tooze would have us believe it was the great threat of German militarism to liberal values - combined with the democratic liberation of the Russian Revolution - that tipped his hat into the ring. Yet as David Kennedy makes clear in "Over Here," Wilson had already decided on war by late 1916, to the dismay of his early Progressive supporters. His electoral rhetoric of that year must stand beside Lyndon Johnson in 1964 in the records of campaign duplicity. Tooze himself lets it out of the bag when he recognizes that the specter of French and British default on war loans - should Germany prevail - would cause such havoc on Wall Street that it might have led to a Great Depression 12 years earlier. Thus Wilson was "forced" into intervention by factors that had nothing to do with the safety of Democracy, unless defined by dollar value.Which brings me to Professor Tooze's take on the Russian Revolution, again treated in conventional Western manner. Tooze does offer some half-forgotten insights - that the revolutionary defensists of the Provisional Government echoed Wilson's earlier idealism; and that Wilson's surrender to war left them holding the globe of peace on shoulders much too frail. Yet the collapse of Western democracy in Russia was more fundamental than the trope of "Bolshevik subversion" Tooze reiterates. Russian politicos tried to create a Western-style middle-class democracy in a country without an appreciable middle class. The rise of soviets represented a bottom-up, direct style of self-rule suited to workers, peasants, minorities and soldiers who were as segregated from official state and society as Delta sharecroppers. It's revealing that Tooze does not once use the term "soviet democracy," the ubiquitous phrase throughout 1917. It was in this breach of opposing, class-based definitions that Lenin found his opportunity. And also in Kerensky's Wilsonian hope, in continuing the Tzar's war over the wishes of those forced to fight it, that Allied victory in Germany would rescue Russian democracy before collapse.. This proved as vain as Lenin's own hope for socialist revolution in Germany (but with better luck for him).This is also demonstrated in the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly in late 1917. Yes, it was the greatest uncorrupted example of participatory, representative democracy to date, shadowed by Lenin rather than the US Supreme Court. But Tooze makes a common mistake in believing this process, as reflected in party lists, represented reality on the ground. The Russian voter was more

radicalized than the leaderships of these parties - whose ad hoc frailty should not be forgotten. Neither did his participation mean a disavowal of the October insurrection. The canny peasant voter - and many workers and soldiers with him - sought to play both against the middle by voting his choice on one hand, and with the other accepting whatever the new Soviet Power could give him. That Lenin made short-run good on slogans of land and peace had as much to do with the "loss of democracy" in Russia as closing down the Tauride Palace by force of arms, and explains why the latter was possible. The Russian Democrats feared the Constituent Assembly would be too radical, as Lenin feared it would be too "bourgeois." The Provisional Government, as good middle class liberals, repeatedly postponed it because they feared "the dark people" - the unwashed, illiterate, incitable masses of the villages, factories, and barracks - as much as they did the Germans,Finally, Tooze seems to exclude the US itself from the class of political revolutionaries who upended the postwar order. FDR's New Deal was right up there with the New Orders of Hitler, Stalin, and Japan in its radical recoordination of state and capital and in crash militarism. Tooze seems to feel that since no overt political revolution or bloodpurge was necessary in the US its democratic continuity remained. Yet the American "power state" he ascribes to the post-WW II world arose in the late 30s based on a military-industrial nexus, exactly as in the revolutionary triumvirate above. It's revealing that in Washington no revolution needed betrayal, no democracy overthrown, to do so.

Winner of the Los Angeles Times Book Prize - HistoryFinalist for the Kirkus Prize - NonfictionA searing and highly original analysis of the First World War and its anguished aftermath In the depths of the Great War, with millions dead and no imaginable end to the conflict, societies around the world began to buckle. The heart of the financial system shifted from London to New York. The infinite demands for men and matériel reached into countries far from the front. The strain of the war ravaged all economic and political assumptions, bringing unheard-of changes in the social and industrialorder. A century after the outbreak of fighting, Adam Tooze revisits this seismic moment in history, challenging the existing narrative of the war, its peace, and its aftereffects. From the day the United States enters the war in 1917 to the precipice of global financial ruin, Tooze delineates the world remade by American economic and military power. Tracing the ways in which countries came to terms with America’s centrality—including the slide into fascism—The Deluge is a chilling work of great originality that will fundamentally change how we view the legacy of World War I.

Winner of the 2015 Los Angeles Times Book Prize -- History “For anyone seeking to understand how American predominance was achieved in the years after World War I, and why it catastrophically failed to keep the hard-won peace, Adam Tooze has written an essential book. Epic in scope, boldly argumentative, deftly interweaving military and economic narratives, The Deluge is a splendid interpretive history.” — The New York Times Book “A grand and groundbreaking reinterpretation of World War I and its aftermath.”—Minneapolis Star Tribune “A globe-spanning and wide-ranging examination of how America’s historic decision to join that epochal war changed the U.S. as well as the entire world order, ‘The Deluge’ is also a look at a past that is both terribly remote and hauntingly familiar.”—Salon “Massive, well-researched and eminently readable.”—The Washington Times“Tooze guides us through the numerous diplomatic and economic catastrophes that emerged from World War I. Eventually we start to get a well-rounded and extremely comprehensive insight into why Wilson’s American foreign policy was so misguided.... Excellent... provide[s] us with a superb insight into the collapse of a stable Europe.”—The Daily Beast “Tooze’s analysis, particularly of fears the American capitalist juggernaut provoked, should spark debate, especially in scholarly circles.”—Booklist “A thoroughly researched, much-needed reexamination of America’s role in the aftermath of World War I that will appeal to any reader interested in the interwar period.”— Library Journal, Michael Farrell, Reformed Theological Seminary, Orlando, FL “In this landmark study, Tooze offers an elegant account of the reordering of great-power relations that took place after World War I, at the dawn of ‘the American century.’”—Foreign Affairs, G. John Ikenberry “Adam Tooze’s utterly hypnotic study reaches back to a time in which fragile economies across the world were every bit as intertwined and acutely vulnerable, and where unforeseen economic shocks could be enough to trigger apocalyptic bloodshed. What Adam Tooze has done—a huge, formidable achievement—is to reconstruct a vast global web, and to show how the slightest vibrations on its threads had consequences everywhere, almost regardless of individual fears and hates or venomous ideologies. The breadth of his scholarship also frighteningly illuminates the fragility of peace.” — The Telegraph (UK) “Tooze shows, more emphatically than any other scholar I have read, how decisively and how sweepingly the First World War ended this state of affairs….Tooze's brilliant account also offers much food for thought for any observer of the current international scene.” —The Guardian “The Deluge sets a provocative framework for studies of the Great War, one that places issues of US power and American history at the center. Its well-written critique of US leadership and its insightful account of the intricate policies of the major powers deserve a wide readership among those who wish to understand how the world careened from the Great War into the Great Depression.” —Current History “Bold and ambitious... The Deluge is the work of a fine historian at the peak of his powers, formidable in its range and command of the material, written in strong, muscular prose.... The best of the current deluge of books about the first world

war.”—Ben Shephard, The Observer (UK)“[Tooze’s] new book confirms his stature as an analyst of hugely complex political and economic issues…. Here, as in his earlier work, Tooze shows himself a formidably impressive chronicler of a critical period of modern history, unafraid of bold judgments.”—Max Hastings, The Sunday Times (UK)“Tooze’s book is an invaluable account of why the US and its allies, having defeated Germany in 1918, were unable thereafter to stabilise the world economy and build a collective security system.”—The Financial Times “Amid all the current commemorative news, a clear and compelling rationale as to why it is actually worth going back and looking at the era of the First World War at this particular moment in time.”—Neil Gregor, Literary About the AuthorAdam Tooze is the author of Wages of Destruction, winner of the Wolfson and Longman History Today Prize. He is the Kathyrn and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of History at Columbia University. He formerly taught at Yale University, where he was Director of International Security Studies, and at the University of Cambridge. He has worked in executive development with several major corporations and contributed to the National Intelligence Council. He has written and reviewed for Foreign Affairs, the Financial Times, the Guardian, the Sunday Telegraph, the Wall Street Journal, Die Zeit, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Tageszeitung and Spiegel Magazine, New Left and the London of Books.Excerpt. Introduction On Christmas Morning 1915, David Lloyd George, the erstwhile radical liberal, now Minister of Munitions, rose to face a restless crowd of Glaswegian trade unionists. He had come to demand a further round of recruits for the war effort and his message was suitably apocalyptic. The war, he warned them, was remaking the world. ‘It is the deluge, it is a convulsion of Nature . . . bringing unheard-of changes in the social and industrial fabric. It is a cyclone which is tearing up by the roots the ornamental plants of modern society . . . It is an earthquake which is upheaving the very rocks of European life. It is one of those seismic disturbances in which nations leap forward or fall backward generations in a single bound.’ Within four months his words were echoed from the other side of the battle-lines by the German Chancellor Theodore von Bethmann Hollweg. On 5 April 1916, six weeks into the terrible battle of Verdun, he confronted the Reichstag with the stark truth. There was no way back. ‘After such dramatic events history knows no status quo.’ The violence of the Great War had become transformative. By 1918, World War I had shattered the old empires of Eurasia – Tsarist, Habsburg and Ottoman. China was convulsed by civil war. By the early 1920s the maps of eastern Europe and the Middle East had been redrawn. But dramatic and contentious as they were, these visible changes acquired their full significance from the fact that they were coupled to another deeper, but less conspicuous shift. A new order emerged from the Great War that promised, above the bickering and nationalist grandstanding of the new states, fundamentally to restructure relations between the great powers – Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, Russia and the United States. It took geostrategic and historical imagination to comprehend the scale and significance of this power transition. The new order that was in the making was defined in large part by the absent presence of its most defining element – the new power of the United States. But on those endowed with such vision, the prospect of this tectonic shift exerted an almost obsessive fascination. Over the winter of 1928–9, ten years after the Great War had ended, three such contemporaries – Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler and Leon Trotsky – all had occasion to look back on what had happened. On New Year’s Day 1929 Churchill, then serving as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Conservative government of Stanley Baldwin, found time to finish The Aftermath, the concluding volume of his epic history of World War I, The World Crisis. For those familiar with Churchill’s later histories of World War II, this last volume comes as a surprise. Whereas after 1945 Churchill would coin the phrase ‘a second Thirty Years War’ to describe the long-running battle with Germany as a single historical unit, in 1929 he struck a very different note. Churchill looked forward to the future, not in a spirit of grim resignation, but with considerable optimism. Out of the violence of the Great War it seemed that a new international order had emerged. A global peace had been built on two great regional treaties: the European Peace Pact initialed at Locarno in October 1925 (signed in London in December) and the Pacific Treaties signed at the Washington Naval Conference over the winter of 1921–2. These were, Churchill, wrote, ‘twin pyramids of peace rising solid and unshakable . . . commanding the allegiance of the leading nations of the world and of all their fleets and armies’. These agreements gave substance to the peace that had been left unfinished at Versailles in 1919. They filled out the blank check that was the League of Nations. ‘The histories may be searched,’ Churchill remarked, ‘for a parallel for such an undertaking.’ ‘Hope,’ he wrote, ‘now rested on a surer foundation . . . The period of repulsion from the horrors of war will be long-lasting; and in this blessed interval the great nations may take their forward steps to world organization with the conviction that the difficulties they have yet to master will not be greater than those they have already overcome.’ These, unsurprisingly, were not the terms in which either Hitler or Trotsky would capture their vision of history ten years after the war. In 1928 the war veteran and failed-putschist-turned-politician, Adolf Hitler, as well as contesting and losing a general election, was negotiating with his publishers over a follow-up to his first book, Mein Kampf. The second was intended to collect his speeches and writings since 1924. But since his book sales in 1928 were as disappointing as his electoral performance, Hitler’s manuscript never went to press. It has come down to us as his ‘Second Book’ (‘Zweites Buch’). Leon Trotsky for his part had time to write and reflect, because after losing his struggle with Stalin, he had been deported first to Kazakhstan and then in February 1929 to Turkey, from where he continued his running commentary on the revolution that had taken such a disastrous turn since the death of Lenin in 1924. Churchill, Trotsky and Hitler make for an incongruous, not to say antipathetic,

grouping. To some it will seem provocative even to place them in the same conversation. Certainly they were not each other's equal as writers, politicians, intellectuals or moral personalities. All the more striking is the way in which at the end of the 1920s their interpretations of world politics complemented each other.Hitler and Trotsky recognized the same reality that Churchill did. They too believed that World War I had opened a new phase of 'world organization'. But whereas Churchill took this new reality as cause for celebration, for a communist revolutionary like Trotsky or a national socialist such as Hitler it threatened nothing less than historical oblivion. Superficially, the peace settlements of 1919 might seem to advance the logic of sovereign self-determination that originated in European history in the late Middle Ages. In the nineteenth century this had inspired the formation of new nation states in the Balkans and the unification of Italy and Germany. It had now climaxed in the break-up of the Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg empires. But although sovereignty was multiplied, its content was hollowed out. The Great War weakened all the European combatants irreversibly, even the strongest amongst them and even the victors. In 1919 the French Republic may have celebrated its triumph over Germany at Versailles, in the palace of the Sun King, but this could not disguise the fact that World War I confirmed the end of France's claim to be a power of global rank. For the smaller nation states created over the previous century, the experience of the war was even more traumatic. Between 1914 and 1919, Belgium, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Serbia had all faced national extinction as the fortunes of war swung back and forth. In 1900 the Kaiser had brashly claimed a place on the world stage. Twenty years later Germany was reduced to squabbling with Poland over the boundaries of Silesia, a dispute overseen by a Japanese viscount. Rather than the subject, Germany had become the object ofWeltpolitik. Italy had joined the war on the winning side, but despite solemn promises by its allies, the peace reinforced its sense of second-class status. If there was a European victor it was Britain, hence Churchill's rather sunny assessment. However, Britain had prevailed not as a European power but as the head of a global empire. To contemporaries the sense that the British Empire had done relatively less badly out of the war only confirmed the conclusion that the age of European power had come to an end. In an age of world power, Europe's position in political, military and economic terms was irreversibly provincialized.The one nation that emerged apparently unscathed and vastly more powerful from the war was the United States. Indeed, so overwhelming was its pre-eminence that it seemed to raise once more the question that had been expelled from the history of Europe in the seventeenth century. Was the United States the universal, world-encompassing empire similar to that which the Catholic Habsburgs had once threatened to establish? The question would haunt the century that followed. By the mid-1920s it seemed to Trotsky that 'Balkanized Europe' found 'herself in the same position with respect to the US' that the countries of south-eastern Europe had once occupied in relation to Paris and London in the pre-war period. They had the trappings of sovereignty but not its substance. Unless the political leaders of Europe could shake their populations out of their usual 'political thoughtlessness', Hitler warned in 1928, the 'threatened global hegemony of the North American continent' would reduce them all to the status of Switzerland or Holland. From the vantage point of Whitehall, Churchill had felt the force of this point not as a speculative historical vision, but as a practical reality of power. As we shall see, Britain's governments in the 1920s again and again found themselves confronting the painful fact that the United States was a power unlike any other. It had emerged, quite suddenly, as a novel kind of 'super-state', exercising a veto over the financial and security concerns of the other major states of the world.Mapping the emergence of this new order of power is the central aim of this book. It requires a particular effort because of the peculiar way in which America's power manifested itself. In the early twentieth century, America's leaders were not committed to asserting themselves as a military power, beyond the ocean highways. Their sway was often exercised indirectly and in the form of a latent, potential force rather than an immediate, evident presence. But it was nonetheless real. Tracing the ways in which the world came to terms with America's new centrality, through the struggle to shape a new order, will be the central preoccupation of this book. It was a struggle that was always multidimensional – economic, military and political. It was one that began during the war itself and stretched beyond it into the 1920s. Getting this history right matters because we need to understand the origins of the Pax Americana that still defines our world today. It is crucial too, however, to understanding the huge second spasm of the 'second Thirty Years War' that Churchill would look back upon from 1945. The spectacular escalation of violence unleashed in the 1930s and the 1940s was a testament to the kind of force that the insurgents believed themselves to be up against. It was precisely the looming potential, the future dominance of American capitalist democracy, that was the common factor impelling Hitler, Stalin, the Italian Fascists and their Japanese counterparts to such radical action. Their enemies were often invisible and intangible. They ascribed to them conspiratorial intentions that enveloped the world in a malign web of influence. Much of this was manifestly unhinged. But if we are to understand the way in which the ultra-violent politics of the interwar period was incubated in World War I and its aftermath, we need to take this dialectic of order and insurgency seriously. We grasp movements like fascism or Soviet communism only very partially if we normalize them as familiar expressions of the racist, imperialist mainstream of modern European history, or if we tell their story backwards from the dizzying moment in 1940–42, when they rampaged victoriously through Europe and Asia and the future seemed to belong to them. Whatever comforting, domesticated fantasies their followers may have projected onto them, the leaders of Fascist Italy, National Socialist Germany, Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union all saw themselves as radical insurgents against an oppressive and powerful world order. For all the braggadocio of the 1930s

their basic view of the Western Powers was not that they were weak, but that they were lazy and hypocritical. Behind a veneer of morality and panglossian optimism the Western Powers disguised the massive force that had crushed Imperial Germany and that threatened to enshrine a permanent status quo. To forestall that oppressive vision of an end of history would require an unprecedented effort. It would be accompanied by terrible risks. This was the terrifying lesson that the insurgents derived from the story of world politics between 1916 and 1931, the story recounted in this book.