

[Free] The Day the Chinese Attacked: Korea, 1950

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Edwin Palmer Hoyt

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Edwin Palmer Hoyt : The Day the Chinese Attacked: Korea, 1950 before purchasing it in order to gauge whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised *The Day the Chinese Attacked: Korea, 1950*:

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. goodBy Merritt MckinneyLots of information about a very confusing war. Edwin Hoyt does well in sorting it out. He REALLY does not like MacArthur though.1 of 3 people found the following review helpful. typical rehash of newspeak about the Korean WarBy J. M. GillespieThe book has the usual flaws of rehashing typical newspeak by Truman and his administration about the Korean War. It takes the usual cheap shots smearing MacArthur as if he was the cause of the later massive Chinese Communist invasion and attacks on American forces.MacArthur was not the one who went to China in the late 1940's and prevented Chiang Kaishek from defeating the world's worst communist dictator. Mao's long record of mass psychotic murders, torture and utter cruelty was well known but was ignored, denied and disbelieved by the Truman administration.The Truman Administration support of Mao against Chiang that eventually allowed Mao to massacre and cause the deaths of more people than Hitler and Stalin combined. It was Truman who sent General Marshall who forced Chiang to allow Mao and his forces to escape to the Soviet border where Mao's forces were massively re-supplied by Stalin and safe from attack.It was Truman who wouldn't support Chiang when Mao regained strength and came back reinforced to take over China forcing Chiang to flee to Taiwan.As to Korea, it was the Truman Administration in 1949, guided by State Department Secretary Dean Acheson who suddenly withdrew American troops from South Korea. Worse they suddenly surprised the world by publicly announcing that America no longer considered South Korea under its sphere of interest. This sphere had been provided to America by the recent World War Two Yalta agreements that provided

North Korea to the Soviets. The Truman administration policy and this foolish public announcement in effect provided an engraved invitation to the Communists to attack. However Stalin had just come through the 1948 Berlin re-supply effort and the 1949 Communist victory of Mao's take over in China, so he wanted to calm things down for a while so the communists could consolidate their gains. But the Truman stupidity was just too tempting. But Stalin was cautious and he refused to support Kim Il Sum's clamoring requests for permission to invade South Korea now that it had been offered by Truman. Mao flush with triumph in China needed to consolidate his hold and needed an enemy to unite the Chinese under his rule. Hoyt in his book was partly right that the Chinese who for centuries had been dominated by the colonial powers and then Japan were adverse to foreign rule and influence. But of course it was the Soviets who now had dominate influence and who had taken over areas of interest to China following WWII. Mao depended on the Soviets, but Stalin didn't trust him. Mao wanted the Soviets to supply China with the technology to build war making manufacturing plants so China would no longer have to depend on Stalin for weapons. Mao could not get technology from Stalin, so he decided that if the Chinese attacked Taiwan or South Korea, the Americans would have to respond and then he could draw America into a long war where the sheer number of people and size of China located across the Pacific would make it difficult for America to conquer or control, just as the closer Japanese could not conquer. This would force Stalin as the world communist leader to provide him with support and war making factories. And would make Mao a hero among the world's communist supporting nations for opposing capitalism and America. Mao was convinced that America would not support a long drawn war of attrition and was prepared to lose tens of millions of Chinese to drag out a war. Plus having recently conquered Chiang, he had taken over large armies of Nationalist troops that were not loyal to him, so these would be sent first to Korea to be annihilated by the Americans and then Mao wouldn't be blamed for getting rid of them. Mao wasn't after nor worried about MacArthur whose military governorship of Japan and peace keeping forces were mostly new post WWII raw recruits who had no war experience. MacArthur's position had little or nothing to do with Korea or Taiwan except minor co-ordination with other American Government and Military officials in charge of those areas. Mao did not know who the Americans would choose to oppose him. He knew that Truman and his Administration was weak and had foolishly disbanded almost all of the powerful American military that had won WWII. Mao knew that Truman had devastated America's military might soon after WWII so that it no longer had the ability to oppose his vast armies nor Stalin's. He knew that if America tried to support South Korea which Truman said they would not, America would soon run down their supplies and had inadequate forces to quickly send. Stalin had opposed the Korean invasion and was not willing to get involved nor risk significantly challenging America over Korea other than diplomatic, financial, training, military supplies and some minor military support. But, Mao still had his large Soviet supplied Chinese armies that had just conquered China and now command of the larger recently defeated Chinese Nationalist armies, all with recent battlefield experience. Plus if America were to oppose in Korea and if they made it too difficult, Stalin would eventually have to aide China and at least give Mao the technology to build war making factories that was probably Mao's principal goal at the time. None of this had anything to do with MacArthur. Let's imagine MacArthur was ten time more arrogant and grandiose and insubordinate than he was popularly smeared. So what if such smears are a hundred times past fantastically true? What does that have to do with the situation? When the invasion suddenly occurred, Truman knew he was in political trouble for what he had done to cause the war. To cover, he quickly decided to try to defend Korea. He had to face spending years studying and deciding to allow the Communist to take over China and now for having recently promised not to defend South Korea. Truman decided quickly he was in big trouble politically for selling out Korea and had to do something to now defend Korea. Problem was Truman didn't have a way to defend South Korea since he had already mostly destroyed America's military capability. So he decided to use the immense military prestige of MacArthur to hopefully politically show Truman was trying to stop the Communists plus when it failed as expected then he could say he tried and if need be stick the blame on MacArthur for losing a hopeless situation. Only a problem arose, MacArthur in a few months with inadequate untrained, unsupplied, and unsupported forces, naturally had to lead the necessary retreats and coming defeat. But MacArthur finally managed to stop the invasion forces and held out at Pusan, the last tip end of South Korea. Then while gallantly hanging on in Pusan, MacArthur made a daring landing of forces in an unexpected and almost impossible site at Inchon that caught the enemy off guard. MacArthur's daring landing terrorized the enemy for it cut off their supply lines and suddenly placed their armies in a vise between north and south American positions. MacArthur continued to cause them panic by ordering his defending forces in Pusan to counter-attack heading north and his landing forces at Inchon to attack heading south. Suddenly it no longer mattered to the previously victorious enemy forces who still greatly outnumbered MacArthur's forces. MacArthur had likely trapped them in a vise and knowing MacArthur's reputation, they panicked and fled instead of fighting MacArthur's smaller forces. While newspeak and political lackeys still heap scorn and blame MacArthur as a warmongering, insubordinate warrior who brought China into the war, it was not MacArthur. Yes MacArthur unexpectedly defeated the North Koreans and soon drove them out of South Korea, blame him for that. Yes MacArthur favored crossing the 38th parallel, but it was Truman and Marshall and the United Nations who ordered him and our troops to cross the 38th parallel. It was Truman and his administration who ordered and gave him full authority to proceed almost all the way to the Yalu River where only the South Korean forces would be allowed to proceed the last miles to the

borders. Mao through Chou didn't tell MacArthur, but told the Indian Ambassador to warn America that China would go to war if American forces crossed the 38th parallel. It was the Truman Administration that decided to ignore the warning and order MacArthur to march North. It was also the Truman Administration that effectively blinded MacArthur and his troops from learning what was happening across the Yalu border as well as in China and what Mao had planned. MacArthur was forced to rely on whatever intelligence and opinion the Truman Administration edited and furnished him. Worse he was forbidden to fly missions near or across the Yalu River to find out what they were doing. Yes MacArthur protested as such was unheard of and greatly endangered his troops. Of course based on the lousy and limited intelligence Washington fed him and the severe restrictions on him to find out, he had to go along with the Washington theory that China was not preparing and not likely to attack. Which was then spun and used against him to pretend it was MacArthur who said they wouldn't attack and thus the troops could be home by Christmas. But in quoting MacArthur out of context and off the record at Wake Island to Truman, they left out that MacArthur said if the Chinese did attack they would suffer the greatest slaughter for then their supplies lines would be extended and they could be attacked and cut off far from their bases. Which of course is what happened exactly as MacArthur predicted within a few months after they attacked. Mike Gillespie said he would not. ea due to what Mao and So Mao supported Kim Il-sung to invade promising that if he lost, China would guarantee support and invade. If MacArthur

From Publishers Weekly Hoyt (*Kamikazes*) here traces the deterioration of Sino-American relations after WW II as the U.S. tried to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists while supporting Chiang Kaishek against Mao Zedong, hoping to prevent the civil war that brought the latter to power in 1949. The book brings into focus the influence of anticommunist hysteria on that policy, the backlash effect of General Douglas MacArthur's bellicose predictions during the early months of the Korean War and Washington's failure to heed warnings from premiere Zhou Enlai--all leading to the massive Chinese intervention in 1950. What sets Hoyt's book apart from other studies of the war is his sympathetic presentation of the Chinese point of view regarding the origins and conduct of the conflict. The memoirs of Marshal Peng Dehuai, the Chinese field commander, are liberally quoted, explaining how he snuck 350,000 troops across the Yalu in an 11-day period, nearly catching MacArthur's U.N. forces in a trap. Students of the "forgotten war" won't want to miss this book with its fresh slant. Photos. Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc. From Library Journal The title suggests that this book focuses on the Chinese intervention in Korea, a topic well-covered by Allen S. Whiting's *China Crosses the Yalu* (LJ 10/15/60), but it is more than that. Following a review of 20th-century Sino-American relations, Hoyt discusses the entire Korean War, with emphasis on the last two months of 1950. The result is an often simplistic and occasionally confused account of battlefield action and high level policy-making. Reliance on secondary publications is heavy, and where other sources (e.g., interviews) are used little new information or insight is revealed. The lengthy, uncritical, and poorly documented quoting of Chinese leaders is particularly disturbing. Although Hoyt is known for his popular military histories, this is not recommended even for his usual audience.- Kenneth W. Berger, Duke Univ. Lib., Durham, N.C. Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc.