

Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge

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STRATEGIC DENIAL AND DECEPTION

The Twenty-First
Century Challenge



editors

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before purchasing it in order to gauge whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Strategic Denial and
Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge:

17 of 17 people found the following review helpful. Snakes on Scanners! Shields Up!By Dr. Frank StechRoy Godson
and James J. Wirtz (Editors), Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge. Transaction Pub;
ISBN: 0765801132; (March 2002).This new volume signals a post Cold War revival of attention and interest in
deception, a revival growing in Washington since the mid-1990s. Experiences with the deceptions of the Iraqis,

Somalis, Serbs, North Koreans, various transnational terrorists, and narco-criminals have revived awareness in the United States that deception is among the time-honored techniques of asymmetrical warfare, capable of allowing the weaker, but deceptive opponent to surprise, wound, or even defeat a far stronger adversary. Attention to deception and counter-deception, focused in the 1980s on the Soviet threat, has revived to address the new post Cold War threats, what one observer called the "snakes in the grass." Attempts to bury deception inside the befuddled complexity of "information operations" are failing: deception is back, it's a problem, and people are doing something about it. Academic conferences, research journal articles, and scholarly volumes of analysis and theory such as this one signify that deception and counter-deception, until recently buried in the classified world, limited to informal intelligence agency committees and think tank working groups, have again become quasi-respectable, if not altogether mainstream, stand-alone concerns in the American national security structure. The informal committees are becoming formally chartered, working groups turning into boxes on organizational charts, and analysts are going back to schools to catch up on theory, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Policy makers are pressed to take sides: for or against using deception; needing or rejecting the need for counter-deception. More conferences, journal articles, and volumes are on undoubtedly on the way. The participants all need to read this book. On the bow-wave of this coming swell of deception concern is Godson and Wirtz's excellent statement of the problems of deception, its challenges to U.S. intelligence, the success and failure of deceptions by the various snakes under various conditions, and the prospects for detecting and deflecting deception. The posture they describe is wholly defensive: the snakes will deceive U.S. intelligence and the national security policy and decision makers. There is no offensive outlook on deception here, no argument that the U.S. needs a capability to cloak the employment its instruments of national security. Like the starships of the Star Trek Federation, we do shields, deceptive cloaking is only for the Bad Guys. Brigadier General Walter Jajko's incisive commentary in this volume explains exactly why this is, and it likely not to change: the United States simply does not know how to employ deception for national security, and is effectively organized culturally, socially, traditionally, and organizationally not to learn. In the U.S. the practicing field of deception it seems has been yielded to advertising, politics, business, and other criminal enterprises. Godson and Wirtz's chapters lay out the defensive challenge to U.S. national security. Their authors are flagship analysts and theorists of deception's problems, with a healthy leavening of reality-checking national security insiders among them: Abram Shulsky, Richards Heuer, Barton Whaley, M.R.D. Foot, J. Bowyer Bell, Lynn Hansen, Paul Rossa, James Bruce. This volume is a foundation for understanding what we are up against and what we can do about it. 0 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Made the difference in a college course By Eric This is being used as a textbook for a class I am taking. I am still a little old school and need the print edition. Thanks for such quick shipping. It made all the difference. 4 of 9 people found the following review helpful. Review of Strategic Denial and Deception By Elliott Hurwitz This is a mediocre book. First, it resembles a handbook, teaching practitioners how to conduct DD (this acronym really exists). Second, many authors are in the "neo-con" school of intelligence officers, along with Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith. It's somewhat deceiving for a book to represent DD when the Reagan-era "Team B" school from which they graduated has been discredited.

Does foreign denial and deception threaten the interests of contemporary democracies? Strategic denial and deception (DD) has emerged as a little understood challenge to security in general, and the intelligence community in particular. To gain advantages, adversaries seek to deny critical information about their own activities and capabilities, and to deceive foreign governments. In recent years, Iraq, India, Somalia, Colombian criminal groups, and terrorists, for example, have all used DD successfully against the United States. Denial and deception is a low cost, potentially high impact to level political, military, and economic playing fields, particularly against strong opponents. Concerns about the threat of denial and deception have waxed and waned since the end of World War II. Sometimes it shaped assessments about the former Soviet Union, for example. At other times, such as the end of the Cold War, such threats appear to fade into insignificance. This volume considers whether globalization, proliferating communication technologies, and the dissemination of vast amounts of information make effective foreign denial and deception more or less likely. Contributors also examine whether more information and data sources make policymakers better informed or simply create confusion. Drawing on lessons learned from historical experiences, the authors propose ways to minimize future challenges. Chapters include "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," by Abram Shulsky; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of DD," by Barton Whaley; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of DD," by M.R.D. Foot; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of DD," by J. Bowyer Bell; "Arms Control," by Lynn M. Hansen; and "Prescription: Detecting Deception-Practice, Practitioners, and Theory," by Barton Whaley and Jeffrey Busby. While there are previous books about celebrated DD cases, from Troy to Pearl Harbor and D-Day, no work attempts to assess how these instruments of denial and deception can be used in the early twenty-first century. This book will be of interest to students, security planners, and general readers interested in political science, security, and foreign and military policy.

“[T]his is a worthwhile and intriguing volume. Godson and Wirtz have put together an interesting array of

contributors--from academics to practitioners--who offer a penetrating look at the historic and contemporary features of strategic denial and deception... Recommended for undergraduate through research and faculty collections." —C. Potholm II, Choice

About the Author Roy Godson is professor of government at Georgetown University and president of the National Strategy Information Center in Washington, DC. His most recent books include *Strategic Denial and Deception* (Transaction, 2002). James J. Wirtz is chairman and associate professor, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is the co-editor of *Strategy in the Contemporary World*.