


(Download pdf ebook) Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958

Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958

David Galula

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David Galula : Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958:

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. The practical experience underpinning a theory of COINBy Peter MonksIn "Pacification in Algeria", David Galula describes his (largely) successful experiences as a company commander and battalion S3/XO in Algeria in the late 1950's and draws on these experiences and his earlier exposure to Communist insurgency throughout Asia and the Balkans in order to develop and articulate a theory of COIN. Most

of the book is a relatively detached and analytical (albeit honest) discussion of his experience and reaction to events as a company commander in a rather nondescript battalion and AO. The reader expecting exciting accounts of desperate battles or tales of derring-do will be disappointed - not only is combat fleeting, but Galula's perspective is about recounting what he thought and did in a "campaign planning" sense, rather than in the "here and now" tactical space. For anybody with more than a superficial interest in sub-unit operations there is however ample description, explanation and analysis of a range of tactical activities and objectives, be they kinetic or otherwise. Despite the author's obvious scholarly interest in advocating a theoretical approach to COIN, it is still relevant and enjoyable reading for tactical level commanders with more pressing concerns than wading through dense academic tracts. Both Galula's own actions and embryonic theory (explored more fully in *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era) are persuasively argued here - certainly, on first reading "Pacification in Algeria" at a point during a deployment to Afghanistan when I was wondering just how relevant our tactical successes really were, Galula's arguments that successfully shooting insurgents was irrelevant unless accompanied by measures to secure and win the support of the population were nothing short of a revelation. Galula's specific prescriptions should be treated as a guide to further thinking rather than a template, however - the reader should note that his theory was largely shaped by unique and absorbing experiences within his company/battalion AO which were characterised by a relative unity of command on the counterinsurgent side (no indigenous government or security "partners" being mentored here) - even if higher headquarters focused on traditional institutional perspectives and the wrong metrics for too long (sound familiar?) - and a relatively unsophisticated and politically malleable population within the AO. Overall, essential reading for anybody in or around platoon, company or battalion command groups that expect to engage in COIN operations, and highly recommended as a pivotal part of the "COIN canon" of modern western military thought.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Counter-Insurgent as Social Scientist By Marco Antonio Abarca During 2005-6, it was becoming readily apparent that military situation in Iraq was going from bad to worse. In an effort to get the war effort back on track, many people from generals on down to Think Tanks that support the military began to re-examine many of our basic war fighting assumptions. The Rand Corporation went back into its vaults and re-published David Galula's classic 1963 study of counter-insurgency in Algeria. From 1956 to 1958, David Galula was a captain in the French Army and stationed in the rugged mountains of coastal Algeria. His mission was to counter an insurgency of Algerian peasants who were fighting a war for national liberation. When he arrived in the Kabylia region of Algeria, the insurrection was beginning to pick up momentum. His duty was to pacify one small section of this mountainous region. He brought to this task a wealth of experience that he picked as the French military attache in Hong Kong in the early 1950's. From this posting, Galula had the unique opportunity to experience and learn from insurgencies in China, Indochina and Malaysia. Unlike many of his contemporaries in the Paratroops and Foreign Legion (i.e. Roger Trinquier), Captain Galula was not an advocate of "modern" warfare with its emphasis on hard hitting combat and over-reliance on torture. His approach took on many of the aspects of social science. From the very beginning, Galula understood that in a "people's war" it was critical to segregate the civilian population from the insurgents. His approach emphasized policing over combat and providing services to the civilian population. What makes "Pacification in Algeria" such a compelling read is that it concentrates on the experiences of one company commander in a small geographic area for a period of two years. By looking at a discrete area, one can understand that an insurgency is a much more complicated struggle than is usually understood from a distance. Insurgents can be motivated by such grand motivators as "nationalism" or a "clash of civilizations" but often as not, insurgencies are driven by more mundane things such as land and water rights, family feuds and inter-comunal rivalries. These complexities frustrate those who wish to see the world through a more manichean lense. For readers interested in more nuanced studies of insurgencies, I would recommend Lewis Taylor's "Shining Path; War in the Northern Andes" and David Stoll's "Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala".

6 of 6 people found the following review helpful. A Guide for Counter-Insurgency By TJMjr This book is an absolute required read for anyone who wants to understand the complex nature of fighting counter-insurgencies. Galula who served in Algeria as a deputy commander and as a company commander was responsible for the successful pacification of several areas under his command. Through ideas he gained from experience serving in China he was able to institute a series of lethal and less than lethal measures to defeat the insurgents in his area of operation. He lists his measures and those who are energized can create a check list of sorts to assist them if they are "going down range." Excellent book...

When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France, mired in similar wars for independence in its colonial territories, was in a poor position to cope with further upheaval. The Algerian strategy encompassed varying approaches and was more adaptable than that of the French, necessitating a rethinking of traditional counterinsurgency methods. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command in the district of Greater Kabylia, east of Algiers, at the height of the rebellion, and presents his theories on counterinsurgency and pacification. In the process, he confronts the larger political, psychological, and military aspects of the Algerian war, and provides a context for present-day counterinsurgency operations. This groundbreaking work retains its relevancy as a challenge to traditional counterinsurgency tactics and

presents approaches to predicting, managing, and resolving insurgent and guerilla conflict. The parallels between the Algerian war and modern warfare are striking, and lessons can be extracted from French successes and failures in its drive to contain and manage the Algerian uprising. A new foreword by counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman elucidates the relevance of this historic study in the context of modern times.

To understand the new American military strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan you could download a copy of the Army's counterinsurgency field manual, FM 3-24. Or you could read the elegant, entertaining books by French Lt. Col. David Galula that inspired Gen. David Petraeus in producing FM 3-24. Galula wrote 'Pacification in Algeria' in 1963 at the RAND Corporation, followed in 1964 by 'Counterinsurgency Warfare' at Harvard. Now, both have been reissued. 'Pacification' tracks Galula's two years as a company commander in Algeria and the development of his ideas about counterinsurgency into a successful formula soon adopted by the French force in Algeria... The questions Galula raises in the gripping 'Pacification' couldn't be more current. The French haven't won any wars in a long time, but they excel at theorizing about them... Now, practice is catching up with theory, both in Iraq, where American forces are leaving Forward Operating Bases for quarters in the cities, and in Afghanistan. Ann Marlowe One of the important theorists of counterinsurgency was David Galula, who died in 1967. Galula was a French officer who studied insurgency while serving in a variety of posts in China, Communist-threatened Greece, and in Hong Kong during the French Indochina War. Galula's ideas have emerged as key elements of American counterinsurgency doctrine. His 'Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice' (Praeger, 1964) was one of the first texts used by Army officers in 2005 to come to grips with problems confronting them in Iraq. Far more impressive and readable, but less well known is Galula's 'Pacification in Algeria', written, at RAND's invitation, following his participation in a conference on counterinsurgency in 1962 on similar problems confronting the United States in Vietnam... The similarities between France's mistakes in Algeria and American performance in Iraq are striking... Galula's 'Pacification in Algeria' is an exciting story of the difficulties faced by a small-unit commander striving to succeed in a nebulous counterinsurgency environment. It is a story small-unit leaders in Iraq today will find quite familiar. Journal Of Military History, October 2007 Throughout the history of armies, counterinsurgency warfare has generally been greatly feared, and the drafting of counterinsurgency doctrine generally avoided. This is evident in the lack of any comprehensive approach to the subject, until recently, in virtually every army, including those that have had to deal with insurgencies on a regular basis. Since the invasion of Iraq by the US-led coalition, various approaches has been tried, and, only with the publishing in December 2006 of U.S. Field Manual 3-24, has a new comprehensive doctrine for counterinsurgency operations been established. [The U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24] was penned under the supervision of General David Petraeus, an innovative American thinker, and, since January 2007, the Commander of Multinational Force Iraq. The inspiration for this field manual was a book written almost 50 years ago, after another counterinsurgency in another Muslim country. In 1963, at the urging of the RAND Corporation, Lieutenant Colonel David Galula, a French officer with extensive counterinsurgency experience, including two years in Algeria, wrote what was to become a personal account of his success in pacifying his area of responsibility. The Rand Corporation, in the hope that its lessons can be used in Iraq, has reissued Galula's book. Fifty years after being written, it has become enthusiastically embraced by an army seeking a way out of a quandary brought on partially, I believe, by its overconfidence in high technology weaponry. One may hope that this signals a new openness to ideas and opinions penned outside of America. But the lesson of the author is that pacification requires a long-term commitment and imagination. For the author, every war is a special case requiring a unique strategy. And anyone who thinks that they found a 'quick fix' will have misunderstood David Galula's lesson. Canadian Military Journal, Winter 2007/2008 At this point in the war on terror, even people who think David Galula is a trendy new chef are quick to point to the need for cultural understanding in successful counterinsurgency. Often, they are quicker still to beat up on our military for supposedly ignoring this. They are quite sure that if we just understood the Iraqis/Afghans/Shiites/Sunnis better, we would have made fewer mistakes... Well, perhaps the most successful counterinsurgency operation ever mounted, David Galula's in Algeria, doesn't build the case for the overweening importance of cultural knowledge. The Algerians pacified thanks to Galula's insights were French-speaking (some of the leaders of the FLN barely spoke Arabic). The French took back territory from the rebels not because Galula convinced them that he understood their culture, but because he convinced them that their interests were better served by affiliation with France. (A dozen pages of Galula are worth more than anything written by anyone mentioned in this article. His 1963 Pacification in Algeria, reissued by RAND last year, is a witty, snappy, pre-PC read.). The Weekly Standard, November 26, 2007 From the Inside Flap Originally published in 1963 and featuring a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman, this account of the author's successful command in the Algerian war for independence presents a striking parallel to present-day counterinsurgency operations. About the Author DAVID GALULA graduated from St. Cyr Military Academy in 1939 and served in the French army in the North Africa campaign and the liberation of Italy and France during World War II. In addition, he later served in China, Greece, IndoChina, and Algeria. Lieutenant Colonel Galula died in 1967. Bruce Hoffman is a professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service. He previously held the Corporate Chair in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency and

was director of the RAND Corporation's Washington, D.C. office. He is also Senior Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York and Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies, Washington, D.C.